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ARGUMENT 
I. MR. HILL PROPERLY COMPARED TESTACY WITH INTESTACY. 
In Section I of his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hill analyzed the purpose behind the 
intestacy statues by comparing those statutes to the role of personal planning through the 
use of wills and will substitutes. Appellant's Brief, § I at 1-4. It is the comparison of 
intestacy with testacy that drives Mr. Hill's argument. When a decedent dies testate, the 
probate code strives to discover that specific decedent's intent. When a decedent dies 
intestate, the Legislature chooses who will be heirs based on the presumed intent of the 
average decedent. George B. Reese, Best Friends and Relations: Construing "Issue" in 
Instruments and Intestacy Statutes, 4 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 71, at 71 (Fall 1990). 
Rather than addressing the substance of Mr. Hill's argument, Mr. Nakai argues: 
The right of an individual to testamentary disposition of his or her property 
existed at the time of the Williams decision, and the concept that property 
may be disposed of by will has no relevance to equitable adoption. Further, 
this matter does not involve a will. Determinations regarding equitable 
adoption in the context of a will, as would any determinations regarding 
intestacy in the same context, would be nothing more than an advisory 
opinion. 
Appellee's Brief, § I at 1. With one exception,1 Mr. Hill agrees with these statements, but 
they do not address Mr. Hill's comparison and the lessons to be learned from making that 
1
 Because a will provision may fail, even when a will is admitted to probate, the 
probate court still determines who the decedent's heirs are. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-
301(2)(b); §75-3-402(l)(b); §75-3-411(2011). Thus, equitable adoption could arise in the 
context of a valid will, but only because part of the will fails and estate property passes 
through intestacy. 
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comparison. See Appellant's Brief, § I at 1-4. Mr. Hill believes that it is the 
Legislature's role to determine to whom an estate descends in intestacy. Id. He further 
submits that, when a decedent chooses not to adopt a child, the average decedent would 
not want that child to be an heir. By limiting the definition of "child" to natural born and 
adopted children, the Legislature has eliminated any claim to heirship as an equitable 
adoptee. Id. 
Similarly, Mr. Nakai argues: "Neither does anything cited by Appellant establish 
any type of legislative or societal indication of a shift in the basic tenets of adoption and 
intestate succession." Appellee's Brief, § I at 2. Even if this were accurate,2 "a shift in 
the legislative or societal values" is but one basis for seeking reversal of Williams' 
Estates. In re Williams'Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 85, 348 P.2d 683, 685 (Utah 1960). Mr. 
Hill argued that Williams' Estates was wrongly decided by attacking its foundational 
basis. Appellant's Brief, § I at 1-4. 
Mr. Nakai further argues that Utah law has expanded the class of adoptee/heirs. 
Appellee's Brief at 2 (citing the use of the word "descendants" rather than "issue"). 
2
 The Legislature's repeal of its former probate code and its adoption of the 
Uniform Probate Code constituted a significant shift by the Legislature in the rights of 
intestate heirs, particularly spouses, and more remote descendants, in Utah's probate 
procedures, in the law governing contracts to make a will, in the rights of spouses to 
protection through the elective share provisions, and in a number of other areas. Compare 
generally Utah Code Ann. Title 74 and Title 75 (repealed by Laws 1975, ch. 150, §1) 
with Utah Code Ann. Title 75 (enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 150, §§2-9) 
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While Mr. Hill disputes Mr. Nakai's conclusion,3 Mr. Hill argued that the adoption of the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code effectively overruled Williams' Estates and eliminated 
equitable adoptees as potential heirs. Appellant's Brief, § II A - E, at 4-10. Whether the 
Legislature otherwise expanded the class of heirs is irrelevant to this question. Mr. Hill 
acknowledges the right of the Legislature to expand or restrict the class of heirs. See 
Appellant's Brief, § II A at 4-5. Williams' Estates improperly expanded the class of heirs 
by judicial decree. 
In Sections I and II of his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hill also argued that the equitable 
adoption principle should be applied, if at all, to the rights and duties of children and 
putative adopting parents, and not to a person's rights of succession in intestacy. Id. 
Finally, Mr. Hill explained that the Legislature had the duty and right to establish who a 
decedent's intestate heirs were and that no one has any vested right to inherit a decedent's 
estate. Appellant's Brief, § II A, at 4-5. Mr. Nakai did not address these arguments. 
Overturning Williams' Estates will remove a flawed doctrine and analysis from 
Utah law. Further, it will respect the Legislature's right and duty to determine who is and 
who is not an heir. Finally, it will fulfill one of the fundamental policies of the Utah 
3
 Utah law recognizes that "issue" and "descendants" are synonymous. Compare 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(9) (definition of descendant) with §75-1-201(25) (definition 
of "issue" cross references to subsection (9)); see also Makoffv. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797, 
799 (Utah 1974) ("issue" includes "descendants in any degree"). 
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Uniform Probate Code - the expeditious settlement of estates. See Appellant's Brief, § II 
A at 4-5; §11D at 8. 
The class of people who would be harmed by such a ruling is limited to children 
who are (i) subject to an adoption contract, (ii) where the contract is fully performed 
except for the formal adoption decree, but (iii) only when the putative parent failed to use 
a will or will substitute to distribute the parent's property at death. Only in that limited 
circumstance would a child's rights be affected. This is a very limited class of persons to 
protect on the basis of the application of an equitable principle applied by the courts when 
the power to determine a decedent's heirs rests entirely with the Legislature. Thus, the 
good from overruling Williams' Estates outweighs the potential harm. 
II. THE LEGISLATURE'S ACTION IN REPEALING IN ITS ENTIRETY THE 
FORMER UTAH PROBATE CODE AND ITS ADOPTION OF THE 
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE EFFECTIVELY OVERRULED WILLIAMS9 
ESTATES. 
A. The Presumption That a Legislature Is Aware of Case Law Is 
Rebuttable and Varies Depending on the Facts. 
In Section II, A - E at 4-11, Mr. Hill argues that the Legislature expressly 
excluded as children, and therefore as heirs, the very persons who would be most likely to 
have the relationship upon which to claim equitable adoption - foster children and 
stepchildren. He quoted the relevant statutory language verbatim and applied that 
language to the equitable adoption doctrine. 
Page 4 
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In response, Mr. Nakai argues that the Legislature could have expressly overruled 
Williams' Estates by specifically referring to equitable adoption. Appellee's Brief at 5. 
Thus, he argues: 
[T]he legislature has not specifically abolished equitable adoption in the more than 
50 years since the Williams case, there is no basis for this Court to assume such 
legislative intent through a tortured4 reading of the statutes. 
Appellee's Brief, § II at 5. 
In support of his argument, Mr. Nakai cites State v. Houston, 2011 UT App 350, 
263 P.3d 1226. "We presume the Legislature is aware of our case law." [^12 (citation 
omitted). While the Court may presume that the Legislature is aware of its case law, like 
any presumption, it is subject to rebuttal. Moreover, even when there is no express 
statement that a particular precedent is overruled, it remains possible for the Legislature 
to effectively overrule that precedent. See Appellant's Brief, § II E at 9-11. For example, 
the Legislature effectively overruled the three cases cited by the Supreme Court in 
Williamsy Estate as forming the legal foundation for its decision, notwithstanding there 
was no reference to any of the cases when the Uniform Probate Code as adopted. See 
Appellant's Brief, § I E at 10-11. 
Whatever weight that presumption should have in other situations, where the 
statute at issue is part of a complete repeal of Utah law on a given subject (here the 
4
 The concept of "torturing" a reading of a statute raises images of water-boarding 
members of the Court until they agree with Mr. Hill's interpretation of the statute. Mr. Hill 
denies any intent to use torture in any form to prevail in this case. 
Page 5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
former probate code) and the enactment of an entirely new set of laws (here the Uniform 
Probate Code), the presumption should have little or no weight. The Legislature is far 
more likely to be aware of judicial precedent when repealing, modifying, or enacting a 
single statutory provision than in repealing Titles 74 and 75 of the Utah Code and in 
enacting a new Title 75 of the Utah Code. Laws 1975, ch. 150, § 1 (repeal of Titles 74 
and 75); Laws 1975, ch. 150, §§2-9 (enactment of Title 75). 
In any event, the weight of any presumption must be based on the facts and 
circumstances of the individual case. When the legal precedent is both of ancient origin 
and oft-repeated, the presumption has greater weight. Olseth vy Larson, 2007 UT 29, 
^[26-36, 158 P.3d 532 (holding Legislature accepted judicial interpretation of statute that 
was ninety years old and repeatedly interpreted by Utah's Appellate Courts). But the 
presumption is entitled to little or no weight when there is a single case precedent and the 
Legislature effectively overrules that precedent as part of the repeal of two entire Titles 
(74 and 75) of the Utah Code and the enactment of an entirely new Title (75). 
B. Neither the North Dakota Nor the New Mexico Courts Have 
Considered the Arguments Raised by Mr. Hill Regarding the 
Application of the Uniform Probate Code to the Equitable 
Adoption Doctrine. 
Mr. Nakai claims: 
Further, other jurisdictions which, like Utah, have adopted the Uniform Probate 
Code continue to recognize the application and viability of equitable adoption 
within that legal framework. 
Page 6 
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Appellee's Brief, § II at 5. In support of this claim, Mr. Nakai cites two cases. While the 
cases recognize equitable adoption, neither case recognizes equitable adoption "within 
[the] legal framework [of the Uniform Probate Code]." 
In Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 9 (N. D. 2000), the North Dakota Supreme 
Court addressed two issues. First, the trial court had ruled that the equitable adoption 
doctrine was a "stranger to North Dakota jurisprudence." Id. at^|7. In response, the 
Court cited a number of North Dakota cases decided prior to its adoption of the Uniform 
Probate Code, and it concluded that equitable adoption was not a stranger to North 
Dakota jurisprudence. Id. at ^ fl|8-17. 
The North Dakota Court then turned to the second issue: Whether the equitable 
adoption principle could be used under the facts of that case5 with regard to child support 
obligations incident to a couple's divorce. Id. at ^ 18-24. In Mr. Hill's view, that is the 
proper place for considering whether an equitable adoption occurred - in determining 
rights and obligations for parents and children. Appellant's Brief, § I B at 3. The Court 
ruled that the equitable adoption doctrine could be used to set child support obligations. 
Johnson, supra at ^ j 34. Not once did the Court refer to North Dakota's version of the 
Uniform Probate Code. Id., seriatim. 
5
 The couple were active duty members of the United States Air Force. They had 
started formal adoption proceedings on several occasions, but transfers had prevented 
them from completing the formal adoption proceedings. Id. at f3. Having not completed 
those actions, they then divorced. 
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In Poncho v. Bowdoin, 138 N.M. 857, 126 P.3d 1221 (N.M. App. 2005), the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court ruling regarding child support 
obligations. The trial court had placed those obligations on a putative father it found to 
have equitably adopted the child rather than upon the child's biological father. Id. at 
^fl4.6 The appeal was uncontested. Id. at [^15. In analyzing the issue on appeal, the Court 
did not discuss any provisions of the Uniform Probate Code adopted in New Mexico. Id., 
seriatim. While it discussed Johnson v. Johnson, it chose not to follow its holding. Id. at 
1ff[19, 21, 22, 31-33. It therefore reversed the trial court determination and remanded for a 
determination of the biological father's child support obligations. Id. at ^ [38. 
G Mr. Hill Properly Cited Utah Code Ann. §75-1-102(2) and §75-2-701. 
Mr. Nakai claims that Mr. Hill failed to cite a relevant part of Section 75-1-102(2) 
(the underlying purposes of the probate code) that provides that one underlying purpose is 
"to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property." 
Appellee's Brief, § II at 6. A decedent's intent is only relevant when the decedent 
undertakes personal planning through wills or will substitutes. "An intestate transfer, on 
the other hand, presents by definition no effective indication of the decedent's 
intentions." George B. Reese, Best Friends and Relations: Construing "Issue " in 
6
 The equitably adopting father filed an affidavit in which he alleged that, after 
receiving legal advice from his attorney, he believed "it would be in Child's best interest 
that he, [the equitably adopting father], be adjudicated as the adoptive father of Child in 
lieu of [the natural father] and relieve the [natural father] of that obligation." Id. at j^lO. 
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Instruments and Intestacy Statutes, 4 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 71, at 71 (Fall 1990). The 
Legislature's identification of a decedent's intestate heirs is applied regardless of the 
wants or intent of any specific decedent. Until the passage of Section 75-2-101(2) in 
1998, the Legislature's identification of heirs controlled even when the decedent 
expressly disinherited a potential heir. See Matter of Gardner's Estate, 615 P.2d 1215, 
1218 (Utah 1980) (decedent's will expressly disinherited grandchildren; Supreme Court 
noted that, if will failed to distribute all of the decedent's property, grandchildren would 
inherit estate in intestacy even though expressly disinherited in will); compare Utah Code 
Ann. §75-2-101(2) (1998) (authorizing disinheritance of an heir in decedent's will); see 
Appellant's Brief, § I B at 3, fn. 5. 
Mr. Nakai also argues that Section 75-2-701 (1975) (requiring contracts to make or 
not make a will to be in writing) is different from equitable adoption. Appellee's Brief, § 
II at 6. Whether the distinction he draws has any significance, Mr. Nakai did note a 
singular similarity. Mr. Nakai noted that the purpose for enacting Section 75-2-701 was 
that "oral contracts not to revoke wills have given rise to much litigation in a number of 
states." Appellee Brief, § II at 6. As the ALR article on the modern status of equitable 
adoptions demonstrates, that same criticism applies with equal or greater force to the 
equitable adoption doctrine. 122 A.L.R. 5th 205, "Modern Status of Law as to Equitable 
Adoption or Adoption by Estoppel" (2004), seriatim. 
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HI. MR. HILL HAS SHOWN THAT, BASED ON WILLIAMS9 EST A TES, MR. 
NAKAI WAS NOT EQUITABLY ADOPTED. 
A. The Adoption Contract must Be Valid at its Inception. 
Regarding the application of Williams' Estates to the facts of this case, Mr. Nakai 
argues: 
Appellant's basic premise from which his arguments flow is that a valid 
enforceable contact must be determined to be Valid when executed' regarding 
promises made and promises fulfilled. Appellant ignored and failed to mention the 
clear direction in Williams and in other cases to the effect a contract to adopt "may 
be proved by circumstantial evidence" (Id), and instead propounds his own set of 
requirements which he claims must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.7 
Appellee's Brief, § III at 9. Mr. Hill acknowledges that his argument addresses whether 
the adoption agreement was valid when executed, since that correctly states Utah law 
when a single oral discussion of an alleged contract is at issue. McKelvey v. Hamilton, 
2009 UT App 126, ^ [28, 211 P.3d 390 (formation of contract requires offer and 
acceptance). Moreover, in his Trial Memorandum, Mr. Nakai himself identified the 
conversation between his mother, grandfather, and Father Hannifin in 1958 as the basis of 
his equitable adoption claim: 
In 1958, two years after Father Hannifin and Nakai met, Father Hannifin became 
acquainted with Nakai's mother and grandfather. At that time, Father Hannifin 
approached Nakai's mother and grandfather about raising Nakai. Nakai's mother 
7
 Mr. Hill identified the requirements set forth in Williams' Estates and applied 
them to the facts of this case. Compare Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d at 85, 348 P.2d at 
684-85 with Appellant's Brief, § at 14. The Supreme Court set the burden of proof as 
clear and convincing evidence, not Mr. Hill. Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d at 85, 348 
P.2dat685. 
Page 10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and grandfather agreed with Father Hannifin to allow him to take Nakai in and 
raise him as his own son. While the terminology based on the mutual 
understanding of Father Hannifin and Nakai's mother and grandfather of Navajo 
familial culture and law may have been different from legal adoption in certain 
aspects, there can be no doubt but that the parties understood the terms of the 
adoption agreement. 
"Willis Nakai's Trial Memorandum" at 7, R.539. 
Similarly the trial court pointed to this conversation as the basis for Mr. Nakai's 
claim of equitable adoption. R. 568-569, fflj 8-12; specifically ^lO (finding Mr. Nakai's 
father did not participate in "the 1958 discussions which formed the alleged contractual 
basis for Mr. Nakai's equitable adoption claim"). 
Moreover, scrutinizing later circumstantial evidence is done expressly to determine 
whether "an agreement of adoption must have existed." Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d at 
85, 348 P.2d at 685 (emphasis added). The trial court understood that an adoption 
contract was essential to its ruling. It concluded: "the sixty-year relationship and bonds 
between Father Hannifin and Mr. Nakai were consistent in all respects with the formation 
of and performance of an adoption contract." Findings TJ31, R.579. Further, the trial 
court identified the "only question to be determined herein is whether [Father Hannifin's] 
role was as adoptive parent, with full rights of parentage, rather than as a foster parent, in 
loco parentis or another quasi parent-child relationship." Findings ^14, R.570. Whether 
a valid adoption contract was entered and performed determined what Father Hannifin's 
role was in the life of Mr. Nakai. Thus, Mr. Hill properly focused on the formation of the 
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alleged contract and explained why the trial court's findings showed that there was no 
valid contract in the first instance. Appellant's Brief, § IV A - D at 13-20. 
B. For an Adoption Contract to Exist and Support a Claim for Equitable 
Adoption, the Parents must Promise to and must Actually Relinquish 
Their Parental Rights. 
Mr. Hill has never argued that there is any magical word that needs to be stated in 
order to relinquish one's parental rights. Compare Appellant's Brief, § IV B-C at 14-19 
with Appellee's Brief, § III A at 11. Indeed, there was no need to do so. The trial court 
found there was no actual relinquishment. Findings, ^[25-27, R.575-576. 
In Utah, for an equitable adoption to exist, the "child's parents [must] agree with 
the adoptive parents to relinquish all their rights to the child," and then the child's parents 
must fully perform that agreement. Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d at 85, 348 P.2d at 685. 
When the natural parents relinquish their parental rights, whether in a formal adoption or 
an equitable adoption, the adopting parent assumes those relinquished rights. There is 
no place for joint ownership of parental rights. One party has parental rights while the 
other does not. Without a relinquishment, there are no rights for the adopting parent to 
assume. Without the assumption of these rights, the adopting parent cannot fulfill the 
"role of an adoptive parent.. ." Findings, ]fl4, R.570. Thus, without an actual 
relinquishment, Father Hannifin assumed the role of a "foster parent, in loco parentis or 
another quasi parent-child relationship" while the parental rights remained fully vested 
with Mr. Nakai's natural parents. Findings, |14, R.570. 
Page 12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial court found that Mr. Nakai's father acquiesced in the adoption agreement 
between Father Hannifin and Mr. Nakai's mother and grandfather. Findings, [^30, R.576. 
Mr. Nakai claims the evidence of his father's acquiescence was "uncontroverted." 
Appellee's Brief, § II B at 14. There was no positive finding that supported the trial 
court's conclusion. For example, there was no finding that Mr. Nakai's father was even 
aware of the alleged contract. Instead, the trial court relied on the absence of evidence to 
conclude that the natural father, who was living on the reservation at the time of the 1958 
conversation, acquiesced to an agreement reached in that conversation even though Mr. 
Nakai's father took no part in that conversation. Findings, 1fl|30, R.576; TJIO, R. 568 . A 
lack of evidence is difficult to controvert, especially when Mr. Nakai had the burden of 
persuasion by clear and convincing evidence. Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d at 85, 348 
P.2d at 685. The trial court should have required Mr. Nakai to produce evidence that his 
father relinquished his rights. 
Paragraph 30 of the trial court's findings effectively placed the burden of 
persuasion on Mr. Hill to prove that Mr. Nakai's father had not relinquished his rights. 
Since the burden of persuasion was on Mr. Nakai, it never occurred to Mr. Hill to put on 
evidence regarding the continued relationship between Mr. Nakai and his father. 
Although minimal, there was evidence before the trial court of the continued relationship 
between Mr. Nakai and his father. R.17. See Appellant's Brief, § IV C at 18-19. 
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Finally, acquiescence may be sufficient for other states to find an equitable 
adoption, but in Utah, where the equitable adoption doctrine expressly requires each 
parent to promise to "relinquish" and to "relinquish" the parent's parental rights, 
acquiescence is not enough. Id. 
C. The Indian Child Welfare Act Further Establishes That Mr. Nakai Is 
Not Entitled to Be Treated as an Equitably Adopted Son. 
Mr. Nakai's citation to the Indian Child Welfare Act further supports Mr. Hill's 
position. Section 1911 of the Act grants the tribe exclusive jurisdiction over child 
custody proceedings for tribal children living on the reservation, although subsection (b) 
authorizes a transfer of jurisdiction to state courts in certain circumstances. 25 U.S.C.A. 
§1911(a) and (b). Under Section 1913 of the Act, for an Indian parent's consent to be 
effective to authorize a foster placement or the termination of the parent's parental rights, 
the consent must be in writing and recorded before a state or tribal court. 25 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1913(a). In addition, an Indian parent may withdraw consent "for any reason at any 
time" until the entry of a final order authorizing foster placement or terminating parental 
rights. 25 § 1913(c). When consent is withdrawn, the state must return the child to the 
Indian parent. Id. None of these provisions are compatible with the equitable adoption 
doctrine. Indeed, where Navajos are not concerned with the termination of legal rights, 
where the obligation to tribal children extends beyond the parents to other family 
members, and where adoption is informal and practical rather than legal, there is no place 
in Navajo law for the operation of the equitable adoption doctrine. See In the Matter of 
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J.J.S., a Minor, 4 Navajo Rptr. 192, ^ 40 (Navajo D. Ct. 1983). The trial court found that 
Navajos "never voluntarily relinquish their [parental] rights — " Findings {^25, R.575. 
While Mr. Nakai may petition a Utah court under Utah law for recognition as an equitably 
adopted child, he must, like anyone else seeking such relief, meet the requirements of 
Utah law irrespective of any Navajo laws or customs. 
D. Mr. NakaFs Description of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine Is 
Inaccurate, 
Mr. Nakai argues that equitable adoption is "an equitable and fluid concept based 
on the 'doctrine that equity regards as done what should have been done.'" Appellee's 
Brief, § III C at 16. The doctrine is not fluid. It cannot be applied absent a binding 
adoption contract that is fully performed except for the entry of a decree of adoption. 
Williamsf Estates, 10 Utah 2d at 85, 348 P.2d at 684-85. The adoption contract is required 
before equity can be applied to complete the contract (treat as done what should have 
been done). Id. In essence, Mr. Nakai seeks to transform the doctrine from a limited 
doctrine used only when an adoption contract was executed and performed in all respects 
except for the entry of a decree of formal adoption into an unstructured analysis of how 
close and loving the parties were. That is contrary to Williams' Estates and the role of the 
Legislature in determining the identity of a decedent's heirs. 
In his Statement of the Case, Mr. Nakai states: 
During his lifetime Father Hannifin ensured that the bulk of his assets, 
including his Episcopal life insurance policy, bank accounts and investment 
accounts, transferred to Mr. Nakai upon his death. 
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Appellee's Brief at x. What Mr. Nakai fails to note, however, is that Father Hannifin 
transferred his investment accounts pursuant to a beneficiary designation that he executed 
on June 18, 2007. T. Exh. 111. In Father Hannifin's handwriting, Father Hannifin 
identifies Mr. Nakai's "relationship" to Father Hannifin as his "foster son." Where 
Section 75-1-201 (3) (1975) expressly excludes "foster" children from the definition of 
"child," Father Hannifin's own statement of his relationship to Mr. Nakai merited some 
discussion in the trial court's findings of fact. But there was none. Findings, R.566-581, 
seriatim. Like Mr. Nakai, the trial court improperly treated the equitable adoption 
doctrine as a "fluid" concept and reached its result in spite of, not because of, Williams' 
Estates. 
In his argument in Section III C of his Appellee's Brief, Mr. Nakai argues that the 
equitable adoption doctrine does not require the child to show compliance with all 
statutory requirements for a formal adoption. Appellee's Brief, III C at 15. This is not 
what Mr. Hill is arguing. Instead, Mr. Hill is arguing that the child must show clearly and 
convincingly that the natural and adopting parents fully complied with the requirements 
established by the Supreme Court in Williams' Estates. Appellant's Brief, § IV D at 19-
20. It is Williams' Estates that established what must be proven. Applying Williams' 
Estates to the facts of this case, Mr. Nakai does not qualify as an equitably adopted child. 
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IV. IF THE COURT REVERSES THE TRIAL COURT DECISION, IT 
SHOULD REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE 
ATTORNEY FEE AWARD. 
Mr. Nakai obviously does not want the award of attorney fees to be reviewed by 
the trial court. His legal basis for claiming that the Supreme Court should not remand is: 
"Mr. Nakai was appointed the personal representative of the estate. Appointment requires 
the applicant to be an interested person." This is misleading. The definition of an 
interested person is broader than the persons who have the right to serve as a personal 
representative. Compare Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(24) (definition of interest person 
includes fiduciaries representing interested persons and the settlor of a trust, among 
others) with Utah Code Ann. §75-3-203 (identifying those entitled to appointment as 
personal representative and their order of priority). Mr. Nakai would only have a claim to 
appointment as a personal representative after the trial court found him to be equitably 
adopted. But he had no right whatsoever prior to that point. On the other hand, Mr. Hill 
(and other collateral heirs) would have had the right to appointment from the beginning, 
even if Mr. Nakai were later determined to be an equitably adopted child. Utah Code 
Ann. §75-3-203(1) (d) (granting priority to "other heirs"). Under these circumstances, the 
Court should remand the attorney fees issue for further proceedings if the Court reverses 
the trial court's decision on equitable adoption. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on these arguments, the Supreme Court should reverse the trial court, order 
it to enter judgment in favor of Max Hill as special administrator of the estate on behalf of 
the collateral heirs, order it to appoint Max Hill general personal representative of the 
estate, remand for reconsideration of the attorney fee award, and direct it otherwise to 
administer the estate pursuant to provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
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